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ELLIPSES OF WORLD LITERATURE 
 
 







In his recent essay, “Incomparable: The Destiny of Comparative Literature, 
Globalization or Not” (2007), Jan Ziolkowski has occasion to reflect on the field’s 
perpetually troubling designation. He cites the case of Lane Cooper, professor at 
Cornell University, who, in the 1920s, as Comparative Literature departments 
spawned across North America, outright refused to surrender to fashion and 
insisted on giving his department what he believed was a far more accurate label: 
“The Comparative Study of Literature.” As Ziolkowski concedes, the name 
“Comparative Literature” indeed would appear to be intelligible only when the two 
components are construed as shorthand, with the term comparative “denoting 
‘based on or involving comparison’ and literature as an ellipsis for ‘literary 
studies.’”1 According to Ziolkowski, a formidable Latinist, Cooper’s all-too-literal 
mind neglected to appreciate the elliptical force of the discipline’s appellation. In 
Cooper’s own words, “comparative literature” is a “bogus term” that “makes neither 
sense nor syntax”—“You might as well permit yourself to say ‘comparative potatoes’ 
or ‘comparative husks.’”2 If an ellipsis involves a stipulation, whereby the addressee 
agrees to supply what has been omitted, then Cooper irritably is in breach of 
contract, declining to provide mentally the parentheses that would fill out the verbal 
construction: “(The) Comparative (Study of) Literature.”  
                                                        
1 Jan Ziolkowski, “Incomparable: The Destiny of Comparative Literature, Globalization or Not,” The 
Global South 1 (2007), 16–44: 21. 
2 Lane Cooper, Experiments in Education (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), 75; cited in 
Ziolkowski, “Incomparable,” 21. 
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Ellipses of all kinds have long hounded Comparative Literature, beginning 
with this issue of the name’s descriptive inadequacies. Although it now firmly holds 
its place as an institution, with most major universities across the globe boasting 
vibrant graduate programs and with a host of professional organizations 
contributing to the discipline’s legitimacy and autonomy, the familiar moniker has 
always been a matter of contention. Roughly contemporaneous with Cooper, in 
1931, now referring to the standard French designation, la Littérature comparée, 
Paul van Tieghem also admitted that “this term is not an accurate indication of the 
subject and there are other healthier and clearer terms than this one.”3  To be sure, 
despite the name’s shortcomings, there was ample justification to retain Littérature 
comparée: first, on the basis of sheer prevalence, having been in circulation since 
1830, when Abel-François Villemain used it to title his Sorbonne lectures; and 
second, because it aligned the study of literature with the other “comparative” 
disciplines that emerged throughout the nineteenth century, including Comparative 
Zoology, Anthropology, Anatomy, and Linguistics. Still, van Tieghem regrets that the 
term is wanting, omitting important aspects of his academic field. A more 
discriminating name would be more substantial (“healthier, clearer”). Like Cooper, 
he proposes “The Comparative Study of Literature” or perhaps “Comparative 
Literary History.” Thus, van Tieghem’s gesture toward correction again implies that 
comparative literature is an ellipsis, eliding a word or words necessary for a fully 
“accurate” construction.  
The Greek noun leipsis (an “omission,” a “minus”), derived from the verb 
leipein (“to leave, forsake, be wanting”), is used to form both elleipsis (a “falling 
short,” a “defect”) and ekleipsis (an “abandonment,” a “failing to appear,” an 
“eclipse”). Modern rhetoricians, from the sixteenth century on, frequently conflated 
ellipsis and eclipsis, interpreting both as a “leaving out,” even though ellipsis is clearly 
formed with the prefix en-, thus denoting “an omission in (the discourse, text, or 
construction).”  At any rate, in its syntactic sense, the term comes to signify any 
abbreviation, lacuna, or omission of words made consciously or not.  Although 
Quintilian preferred to treat ellipsis as an artful figure, modeled on synecdoche, by 
                                                        
3 Paul van Tieghem, “La littérature comparée” (Paris, 1931) 
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which “we understand something that is not said” (quod tacetur accipimus), he 
granted that many verbal omissions are little more than vicious barbarisms 
produced by thoughtless speech or grammatical idleness.4 For Cooper and van 
Tieghem, “comparative literature” and “littérature comparée” are ellipses in this 
latter sense: unfortunate accidents of language that are now deeply entrenched in 
popular usage, compelling scholars to broadcast their work deficiently for lack of 
“healthier and clearer terms.” Sadly, the current names put the discipline itself at 
risk, leaving it scantily clad out in the cold, letting it shiver while the sun of sufficient 
reason rests in total eclipse.  
Benedetto Croce had already sounded a similar alarm back in 1903, when he 
disparaged Letteratura comparata as an utterly incomprehensible designation for 
what appears to be a meaningless practice. Goaded by a recent trip to New York, 
where he fell upon the freshly established Journal of Comparative Literature, Croce 
dismissed this type of scholarship as vain erudition at best. Ignorant of the essence 
of artistic creativity and lacking a defined field of study, Comparative Literature 
hardly counts as a discipline, content merely with exploring “le vicende, le 
alterazioni, le aggregazioni, gli svolgimenti e gli influssi reciproci” of literary 
themes.5 However, Croce was heartened by the editorial work of Max Koch who, 
having founded the Zeitschrift für vergleichende Literatur in 1887, eventually 
supplemented it with a second journal, Studien zur vergleichenden 
Literaturgeschichte, established in 1901. Croce surmised that Koch came to realize 
that the concept of “comparative [compared or comparing] literature” obfuscated by 
omission the true character of the scholarship and therefore ultimately demanded a 
more fitting designation.6 To illustrate, Croce translates Koch’s own description of 
what “comparative literary history” should entail:  
[It must pay special attention] “all’intimo legame tra storia politica e storia 
letteraria, il quale, forse, di solito, non è messo in rilievo in tutta la sua importanza; e 
                                                        
4 “Quidam synecdochen vocant et cum id in contextu sermonis quod tacetur acipimus: verbum enim 
ex verbis intellegi, quod inter vitia ellipsis vocatur […]. Mihi hanc figuram esse magis placet.” 
Quintilian, Inst. orat. 8.6.21.  
5 Benedetto Croce, “La ‘Letteratura comparata’” [1903], in Manuale storico di letteratura comparata, 
Armando Gnisci and Franca Sinopoli, ed. (Rome: Meltemi, 1997), 73–78: 74.  
6 Croce, “La ‘Letteratura comparata’”, 77. On this point, see Susan Bassnett, Comparative Literature: A 
Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 2–3. 
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al legame tra storia della letteratura e storia dell’arte, svolgimento letterario e 
svolgimento filosofico, u.s.w.”7  
 
For Croce, it is especially Koch’s und so weiter that deserves comment, for this 
comparative historical approach moves tirelessly beyond the superficial collection 
of themes, recognizing that it must penetrate more deeply and consider 
“everything”—“‘tutti’ gli antecedenti dell’opera letteraria, vicini e lontani, pratici e 
ideali, filosofici e letterari, legati in parola o legati in forme plastiche e figurative: 
und so weiter.” Koch’s standard, casual clausula—u.s.w.—may appear semantically 
empty, funneling the paragraph out into silence, but it in fact betokens an infinite 
fullness, economically interrupting an accumulative list that thereby never ends. 
Whereas the name “comparative literature” camouflages the nature of Koch’s real 
work—“comparative literary history”—the latter term itself harbors an elliptical 
nature by necessarily referring to the plenum of transcultural and transhistorical 
material, all the antecedents, links, and forms that can only be expressed by the 
exhaustive and exhausted legerdemain of and so forth. By omitting further reference 
to finite fields, the ellipsis marked by und so weiter opens onto an infinite task. It is 
worth recalling that the abbreviating formula that Latin renders as et cetera is 
rendered in ancient Greek as kai ta loipa (“and the rest”), which tellingly employs 
the adjectival substantive of our elliptical verb leipein…   
 
 
This marked ellipsis, which poses as a minus but indicates a plus, is different from 
the “deficiency” discerned in the name comparative literature, which is disparaged 
for confusing a body of work (“literature”) and the interpretation of that work 
(“literary studies”). Certainly, however, the conventions of English warrant using 
“literature” as an ellipsis for “literary studies.” As the Oxford English Dictionary 
attests, the primary meaning of “literature,” dating back at least to the fifteenth 
century, is “familiarity with letters or books; knowledge acquired from reading or 
studying books”; the narrower sense of “printed matter” being but a later 
                                                        
7 Croce, “La ‘Letteratura comparata’”, 77.  
 5 
development of the nineteenth century.8  All the same, Lane Cooper et alii did raise 
an important point, which becomes ever more crucial when we turn to Comparative 
Literature’s longtime running mate, “World Literature.” Boasting an honored 
provenance from Goethe, who famously predicted the obsolescence of national 
literatures in favor of a grander, humanist Weltliteratur, and later receiving 
ratification in Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto, World Literature has of late 
come to the fore as a redeeming, cosmopolitan conception for a discipline perceived 
as fatally Eurocentric. In contrast to the institutional history of Comparative 
Literature, which was purportedly concerned with tracing and thus essentializing 
the cultural roots of national identities, World Literature would be emphatically 
transnational, introducing an expansion that would allow comparatists to realize 
their utopian dream of attaining encyclopedic breadth by means of ethically 
equitable, ecumenical scholarship. Yet, given the massive efforts to incorporate 
curricular changes and publish representative anthologies of primary sources, the 
meaning of World Literature tends to oscillate uncomfortably between material and 
mode of analysis, between a vast collection of work and a proposed methodology. 
What, indeed, is World Literature? Are we dealing with noeses (processes of 
thought) or with noemata (objects of thought)? Does the term refer to a delimited 
set of texts? Or does it imply rather a particular approach for studying these texts, 
an approach that entails a specific series of questions? 9  Faced with the 
indistinctness of the explanandum and the explanans, one is tempted to rehearse the 
old frustration: Should “World Literature” be read literally or elliptically?  
It bears noting that, beyond the issue of nomenclature, both Comparative and 
World Literature frequently inspire elliptical formulations from their practitioners, 
signaling a fundamental uncertainty in those who are pressed to provide a clear 
definition of what in fact they do. In his official report for the American Comparative 
Literature Association (ACLA), composed in the early 1990s, when the field was 
                                                        
8 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “literature.”  
9 Cf. Xavier Landrin, “La sémantique historique de la Weltliteratur: genèse conceptuelle et usages 
savants,” in A. Boschetti, ed., L’espace culturel transnational (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2010), 
73–134: 74.  
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beset by the growing demands of “multiculturalism,” Charles Bernheimer eloquently 
stammered forth a response:  
Comparison is indeed the…what is it?—activity, function, practice? all of these?—
that assumes that our field will always be unstable, shifting, insecure, and self-
critical.10  
 
Possessing neither a specific object of study nor a distinguishing methodology, 
never occupying a single field, belonging everywhere and hence nowhere, 
comparatists have long been accustomed to the harried nature of being in 
permanent crisis. In Bernheimer’s language, the ellipsis—graphically marked by the 
conventional three points de suspension and reinforced by the intervening questions, 
the asyndeta, and the long dashes—vividly conjures the feelings of haste, urgency, 
and anxiety that the literary scholar is wont to convey. That is to say, here the 
ellipsis is clearly being employed as a trope. Expressing a failure to express, it is a 
gesture of disruption or reticence, a nearly pious Abbruchsformel, akin to classical 
aposiopesis and its relation to conflicting emotions.  
In a positive light, Bernheimer’s elided statement, coupled with groping 
queries, displays an open-endedness, albeit in a way that differs from the und so 
weiter singled out by Croce, for Bernheimer alludes to a radical indeterminacy, 
which is nothing other than the fundamentum concussum of comparative work. That 
said, he also appears to rely on the ellipsis-contract, whereby his immediate 
addressees—the members of the ACLA—implicitly agree to supply the sense of the 
lacunae, each according to his or her inclination. For, as rhetoricians have always 
known, the omission of a word or words invites the participation of the listener or 
reader, who is driven to fill in what is missing. The imposed lack leaves room for full, 
non-prescriptive potential. Bernheimer’s stuttering description thereby becomes a 
call to action: Comparative Literature must uphold its definition as something 
indefinable; and comparatists must cultivate an ear for the deficiencies that other 
scholars might ignore. If, as Croce feared, Comparative Literature is elliptical—
falling short of a definite methodology, field, or stable perspective—it is precisely 
                                                        
10 Charles Bernheimer, “The Anxieties of Comparison,” in Comparative Literature in the Age of 
Multiculturalism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 2 (ellipsis in text).  
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these disciplinary shortcomings that enable it to uncover how well-defined 
approaches prove to be insufficient.  
Especially for today’s comparatists who have adopted a World Literature 
outlook, omissions are readily discernible in earlier studies, which were so informed 
by a nationalist paradigm that their authors failed to acknowledge any deficit 
whatsoever. In his essay “Toward a History of World Literature” (2008), David 
Damrosch indicates how the title of Ian Watt’s overview, The Rise of the Novel 
(1957), is an adequate representation of the book only when the reader takes “the 
Novel” as an ellipsis for “the British Novel”; for indeed, Watt restricts his analyses to 
Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding, without any regard for the development of the 
genre in Cervantes or Madame de Lafayette, not to mention novelistic precedents in 
Heliodorus or Apuleius, in Norse saga or in The Tale of Genji.  For Damrosch, the idea 
and ideal of “Comparative Literature” has always been poised to supply what is 
excluded in other troublingly elliptical projects. With the global scope named by the 
rubric of World Literature, it is more than ever prepared to take into account “the 
varied processes and strategies through which writers have individually and 
collectively furthered the long negotiation between local cultures and the world 
beyond them.”11  
 Damrosch consistently champions some idea of “negotiation” whenever he 
attempts to elucidate the salutary effects and benefits of World Literature for the 
study of literature in general.  To be sure, he is very much aware of how, in the past, 
what presented itself as World Literature was damningly narrow. Originally limited 
to a closed set of ancient yet timeless classics, which were said to transcend 
particular cultural and historical contexts, it subsequently came to denote a valued 
collection of masterpieces, a gallery of major achievements of art, ancient and 
modern alike, which were deemed capable of inspiring engagement in great ideas 
shared by all mankind. Only recently has it designated a vast repertoire of diverse, 
potentially alienating works, which stand available for the reader eager to 
                                                        
11 David Damrosch, “Toward a History of World Literature,” New Literary History 39 (2008), 481–95; 
485.  
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encounter difference.12 According to Damrosch, every one of these versions—the 
“classic,” the “masterpiece,” and the “window onto otherness”—bears the risk of 
attracting serious critiques, namely “that the study of world literature can very 
readily become culturally deracinated, philologically bankrupt, and ideologically 
complicit with the worst tendencies of global capitalism.”13  Settling the ontological 
problem of the content of World Literature would hardly resolve the 
epistemological problem of how this content should be critically examined. Both 
issues are further exacerbated by the expansion of the globalized, electronic 
environment in which we now live, where the accessibility of materials has reached 
unprecedented proportions. How would anyone ever be capable of taking such an 
inordinate wealth of texts into consideration? What is to become of the hallowed 
trade of close reading? How many languages can be truly mastered? What role 
should translation play and would it not severely curtail the kind of philological 
work that has been the proud distinction of literary studies?  
 Given these questions and many others, it is no surprise that proponents of 
World Literature tend to spend a good deal of time defining and defending their 
métier, and not simply out of paranoia. Detractors are legion. In the early 1990s, 
while the journal World Literature Today flourished under the directorship of Djelal 
Kadir as the primary organ of postcolonial studies, Claudio Guillén rightfully balked 
at the very notion of “World Literature”:  
What can one make of such an idea? The sum total of all national literatures? A wild 
idea, unattainable in practice, worthy not of an actual reader but of a deluded 
keeper of archives who is also a multimillionaire. The most harebrained editor has 
never aspired to such a thing.14 
 
Guillén’s exasperated tone, variously modulated, continues to resonate to this day, 
from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s obituary, Death of a Discipline (2003)15 to Emily 
                                                        
12 Cf. David Damrosch, What is World Literature? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 15. 
13 “Comparative Literature/World Literature: A Discussion with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and 
David Damrosch,” Comparative Literary Studies 48 (2011), 455–85: 456.  
14 Claudio Guillén, The Challenge of Comparative Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 38. Damrosch cites and discusses this remark in What is World Literature?, 4.   
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), see 
especially pp. 10, 21–22, and 44.  
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Apter’s most recent polemic, Against World Literature (2013).16 Striving to navigate 
between the Scylla of European exceptionalism and the Charybdis of vapid literary 
tourism, Damrosch focuses his attention on the movement of texts and their 
particular trajectories, taking World Literature to refer to “all literary works that 
circulate beyond their culture of origin, either in translation or in their original 
language.”17  
Strikingly, Damrosch calls for “an elliptical approach,” not in reference to the 
grammatical phenomenon, but rather to “the image of the geometric figure that is 
generated from two foci at once”: 
Contemporary America will logically be one focus of the ellipse for the 
contemporary American reader, but the literature of other times and eras always 
presents us with another focus as well, and we read in the field of force generated 
between these two foci. […] If we can plot a series of partially overlapping ellipses 
on our literary globe, we can create a new and dynamic understanding of the 
world’s multiform literatures, and our own multivalent place among them.18 
 
Here, the ellipses of World Literature are entirely recalibrated. Whereas earlier 
work in World Literature could be reprimanded for its elliptical deficiencies, 
Damrosch envisions a method that is ellipsoid, decentering a predominant Euro- or 
even Anglocentrism by including a second center from afar. Like Johannes Kepler, 
who revolutionized the Copernican revolution by positing the Sun’s “fireplace” 
(focus) as one of two points determining planetary orbits, Damrosch wants to 
emphasize World Literature’s eccentricity, allowing for a hermeneutic push and 
pull, between identity and difference, ipseity and alterity. Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether the oversized hearth of American influence will not ultimately 
outshine the gravity of otherness, imposing anew the heliocentric monolingualism 
that well-intentioned comparatists fear.  How can anyone insure that processes of 
homogenization will not cast difference into the shadows? How can anyone prevent 
this eclipse of the foreign? In brief, how might Damrosch’s ellipsoid ideal possibly 
escape the condemnation of being elliptical? After all, although English, unlike 
                                                        
16 Emily Apter, Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability (London: Verso, 2013), 
see especially p. 2.  
17 Damrosch, What is World Literature?, 4.  
18 Damrosch, “World Literature Today,” Symploke 8 (2000), 7–19: 18–19.   
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German and French, distinguishes between the rhetorical ellipsis and the 
geometrical ellipse, it is at least possible to think the two forms together. To borrow 
Gertrude Stein’s syntax, an ellipsis is an ellipsis is an ellipsis… 
 
It would be worthwhile to review briefly how we arrived at the opposing meanings 
between a rhetorical ellipsis, which expresses a subtraction of words, and a 
geometric ellipse, which denotes an addition of centers. According to Plutarch, it was 
Plato who assigned Menaechmus the mathematician with the task of solving the so-
called “Delian Problem” of doubling the cube.19 Upon consulting the Delphic oracle, 
the citizens of Delos learned that they must double the cuboid altar to Apollo in 
order to rid themselves of a horrific plague. Plato interpreted this message as the 
god’s command to cultivate the science of geometry.20 However, the philosopher 
was displeased when Menaechmus abandoned number theory and instead turned to 
mechanical contrivances, namely by cutting a cone to produce the “acute-angled 
section” that led to the mathematical solution.21 A century later, when Apollonius of 
Perga prepared his Treatise on the Conic Sections, he named this closed, oblong 
curve an elleipsis, a “falling short,” because the figure’s “eccentricity” (the ratio of 
distance between the focus and the directrix) is less than 1. Apollonius designated 
each of the conic sections with concrete precision: the parabolē (an “even 
comparison or juxtaposition”) with an eccentricity equal to 1; the hyperbolē (an 
“overshooting”) with an eccentricity greater than 1; and the circle, which is perfectly 
centered, that is, without any eccentricity. 22  
 Independent of geometric analysis, ancient grammarians would come to 
apply the same terms to denote figurative devices and narrative forms: hyperbole 
(“overstatement”); the parable (an equally corresponding “comparison”—in 
                                                        
19 Plutarch, Quaest. conviv. 8, Q. 2.1. 
20 Plutarch, De E, 6.  
21 See Proclus’s account in Proclii Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum, G. Friedlein, ed. 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1873), 111–12; also, Plutarch, Vita Marcelli, 14.5. For a comprehensive discussion 
of the extant sources, with ample bibliography, see George J. Allman, Greek Geometry from Thales to 
Euclid (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, & Co., 1889), 155 – 179. 
22 Apollonius of Perga, Treatise on the Conic Sections, Prop. 1.13. For a complete account, see Thomas 
Little Heath’s introduction to Apollonius of Perga: Treatise on the Conic Sections (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1896), xvii–xxx. 
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German, Gleichnis); and, of course, the ellipsis, which designated any verbal “falling 
short,” whether it occurred by contingency or by rhetorical design. Following 
Quintilian’s suggestion to consider the ellipsis as a trope, modern rhetoricians pored 
over classical texts to locate examples of what George Puttenham characterized as 
“the Figure of default.”23 Together with other terms derived from leipein—primarily 
syllepsis and prolepsis—ellipsis (or eclipsis) was regarded as a highly effective device, 
entirely in accordance with “nature.” As John Duncan Quackenbos explained in his 
Practical Rhetoric (1896), it could be understood as he very hallmark of genius: 
Art everywhere deals in Ellipsis, the unseen is imagined from the visible. And so it is 
in nature. Many things in the universe we know only by inference from what is 
seen—notably nearly one-half of the nearest heavenly body, our moon. “The artist,” 
said Schiller, “is known by what he omits.” Likewise in literature, the true artist is 
revealed by his tact of ellipsis.24  
 
Still, an ellipsis in scholarship may not be as valued as one in art. While 
Franco Moretti, with his trumpeted call for “distant reading,”25 may be criticized for 
dispatching philology to the dark side of the moon, David Damrosch could never be 
accused of any such lunacy. Damrosch is acquitted of this charge, because he 
consistently engages the geometric ellipse of bifocality and not the syntactic one of 
deficiency. In the conclusion to What is World Literature? he makes good on his 
title’s Sartrean promise by offering a list of bullet points, beginning with the key 
figure:  
1. World Literature is an elliptical refraction of national literatures. 
2. World Literature is writing that gains in translation. 
3. World Literature is not a set canon of texts but a mode of reading: a form of 
detached engagement with worlds beyond our own place and time.26  
 
As Damrosch is quick to admit, among these three foci, which represent the context, 
the object, and the reception of literature, the first is the least self-evident, insofar as 
                                                        
23 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 136. See also Johannes 
Susenbrotus, Epitome troporum ac schematum et grammaticorum & rhetorum (Zürich: C. Froschouer, 
1540), 25; and Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (London: 1577), sect. 1.2.2. 
24 John Duncan Quackenbos, Practical Rhetoric (New York: American Book Co., 1896), 268.  
25 Moretti first broaches the concept of “distant reading” in “Conjuecture on World Literature,” New 
Left Review 1 (2000), 54–68. His argument, which in fact aims to rectify the ellipses that threaten any 
attempt to deal with literature on a planetary scale, is elaborated in his latest book, Distant Reading 
(London: Verso, 2013).  
26 Damrosch, What is World Literature?, 282.  
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it employs a provocative description—“elliptical refraction”—which itself demands 
explication. Building on the definition’s distinction between “world literature” and 
“national literatures,” the subsequent explanation alights on the metaphor of travel, 
specifying the idea of “national” as relating to a work’s original cultural 
neighborhood before it goes on to circulate in the world at large. To be sure, the 
travel metaphor is only partially operative, given the fact that there is no suggestion, 
at least initially, of any return. The centrifugal is emphasized at the expense of the 
centripetal. Accordingly, the discussion presses on with accounts of growing 
divergence and diffusion. We are reminded that literary productions bear 
constitutive birthmarks that accompany the text’s journey abroad, “yet these traces 
are increasingly diffused and become ever more sharply refracted as a work travels 
farther from home” (283). By cancelling the return flight, Damrosch allows the 
metaphor of travel to blend with an image from physics or even astronomy—a 
rhetorically sound move, to the extent that both voyage and refraction denote a 
change in direction. The shift from one location to another corresponds to the shift 
in a line’s angle when it passes from one medium to the next. Already with this 
image of refraction, it becomes clear how the initial definition’s three foci may relate 
to each other. The implied movement accounts for how the text “gains in 
translation” as well as for how the reader finds the opportunity for “detached 
engagement” with other worlds. With this last point, in addition to the obvious 
ethical ramifications, a faint hint of vicarious nostalgia creeps in, a longing to send 
the foreign text back home, to compensate for the work’s protracted stay away from 
its origin. From the reader’s perspective, world literature’s value depends on the 
round trip.  
Hence, the “refraction” must be further qualified as “double”: 
Even a single work of world literature is the locus of a negotiation between two 
different cultures. […] World literature is thus always as much about the host 
culture’s values and needs as it is about a work’s source culture; hence it is a double 
refraction, one that can be described through the figure of the ellipse, with the 
source and host cultures providing the two foci that generate the elliptical space 
within which a work lives as world literature, connected to both cultures, 
circumscribed by neither alone. (283) 
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The figure of the ellipse expands or elongates the circle, which is put out of play 
(“circumscribed by neither”), and thus modifies the notion of refraction by allowing 
two shifts in direction, two bends—“two foci.” Disregarding for now the curious 
slippage from the three foci of the initial definition to the two that round it out 
(albeit ovally), it would be worthwhile to analyze this final metaphorical shift. 
Having begun with a metaphor of travel, we wander into the field of optics, only to 
end up in the realm of geometry. Calling attention to these shifts should not suggest 
that the figures employed are not justified, both individually and collectively. Their 
descriptive power is undeniable, offering rich insight into what the concept of World 
Literature entails and how it functions in practical terms. Yet, metaphors are rarely 
as controllable as constructed concepts. Employing bold figures brings with it the 
risk of unintended meanings and connotations.  For this reason, the rapid alteration 
of images that drives Damrosch’s account may be ascribed, consciously or not, to a 
need for constant recalibration, so as to secure the discourse before it escapes 
critical management. By means of frequent scene changes, the author restricts the 
chance of any one metaphor drifting too far afield.  
 Perhaps the most famous usage of the figure of the ellipse to describe 
literature is found in Walter Benjamin’s description of Franz Kafka’s stories. In a 
letter to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin writes:  
 
Kafkas Werk ist eine Ellipse, deren weit auseinander liegende Brennpunkte von der 
mystischen Erfahrung (die vor allem die Erfahrung von der Tradition ist) einerseits, 
von der Erfahrung des modernen Großstadtmenschen andererseits, bestimmt 
sind.27 
 
In somewhat fanciful fashion, Benjamin responds to Scholem’s elliptical 
understanding of Kafka’s mysticism by reconfiguring the writer’s work as an ellipse. 
There is not one central determinant in Kafka’s work, but two. The implicit question, 
then, is whether, at least according to Benjamin, the two foci that determine Kafka’s 
work as an ellipse also cause it to be elliptical in some other sense. Benjamin 
appears to answer precisely this question further on in the letter: 
                                                        
27 Benjamin to Scholem, (Paris, June 12, 1938), in Briefe, 2 vols., G. Scholem and T.W. Adorno, ed. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), 2: 760. 
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Kafkas Dichtungen sind von Hause aus Gleichnisse. Aber das ist ihr Elend und ihre 
Schönheit, daß sie mehr als Gleichnisse werden mußten. Sie legen sich der Lehre 
nicht schlicht zu Füßen wie sich die Hagada der Halacha zu Füßen legt. Wenn sie 
sich gekuscht haben, heben sie unversehens eine gewichtige Pranke gegen sie. (2: 
763) 
 
To say that Kafka’s work is an ellipse is to suggest that it does not consist 
straightforwardly in parables. Although here Benjamin uses the German term 
Gleichnis for “parable,” elsewhere he refers to Parabel—the name for yet another 
conic section, the parabola. As already remarked, the parabolē denotes 
“juxtaposition” or a “comparison by moving from one side to the other,” where both 
sides are equal, where both sides perfectly correspond, where the eccentricity is 
equal to one. Kafka’s parables are excessive—“more than parables”—miserably 
unable to give any adequate version of divine truth or law.28 The Kafkan parable 
gives only itself, excessively and beautifully, falling short of veridical 
correspondence by falling before it. Kafka’s work is an ellipse.  
 In his chapter devoted to Kafka’s literary afterlife, “Kafka Comes Home,” 
Damrosch adduces the ellipse, not as a figure internal to Kafka’s work but rather as 
one that dynamically shapes its reception. To this end, Damrosch assesses the work 
of recent editors, translators, and critics, who respect today’s emphasis on cultural 
context and therefore aim to reconnect Kafka’s writing to its original Czech and 
Jewish conditions. Efforts are thereby made to eradicate the universalizing 
tendencies of an earlier Rezeptionsgeschichte, which, immediately after the Second 
World War, endeavored to turn Kafka into a lonely, existentially overwrought, non-
localizable Everyman. Subsequently, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s seminal 
study, Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (1975), set the stage for appreciating 
Kafka as “minor” figure, presented to an audience now ready to engage with cultural 
difference, to grapple with a body of work without cosmeticizing over its distracting 
birthmarks, and thus to experience regional specificity on its own terms. In literary 
scholarship, this interest corresponds to a shift in concern from textual 
hermeneutics to contextual encounter. Damrosch cites Mark Anderson’s diagnosis: 
                                                        
28 For further analysis on the implications of Kafka’s “inadequacy” or “failure,” see Werner Hamacher, 
“The Gesture in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka,” in Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature 
from Kant to Celan, P. Fenves, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 294–336. 
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Whether Freudian, existentialist, New Critical, structuralist, or poststructuralist, 
these interpretations have offered readings of individual texts in terms of a critical 
methodology that tended to eclipse the historical dimensions of Kafka’s texts. 
Rooted in no particular culture or period, so ran the implicit assumption, his 
writings seemed to be meant for all cultures, thus providing an example of the 
hermetic, anonymous, sui generis modern artwork that apparently validated these 
very formalist, ahistorical methodologies.29  
 
In other words, the readings that “tended to eclipse the historical dimensions” are 
shown to be elliptical, eliding the radical foreignness that would break the vicious 
circle of formalism. Damrosch picks up on Anderson’s trope, when he suggests that 
the new Kafka translations, which renounce earlier, domesticating criteria, is 
responsible for the fact that Kafka “now seems to be eclipsing Thomas Mann” in the 
field of literary studies (188), with “historicist models now often eclipsing formalist 
models” (190).  
 One eclipse or ellipsis deserves another. By revealing how Kafka falls short of 
assimilation, Damrosch demonstrates to what extent the writer’s work can influence 
the ellipsoid orbit that is World Literature—until, of course, the eccentricity of the 
text is reduced to zero, falling short of falling short. A circle, including both 
hermeneutic and vicious ones, is not qualitatively different from an ellipse: the 
circle’s foci simply coincide. As the ancient mathematicians have shown, a 
continuum obtains from one conic section to the next. Given that rhetoric has shared 
its terminology with geometry, it might be enlightening to apply the figures to the 
ongoing development of Comparative Literature’s relation to the literatures it 
compares. We could begin with the circle at the cone’s tip and decline through the 
ellipse, the parabola, the hyperbole, and then back again; that is, we could begin 
with the perfect coincidence between object and method and then move through 
elliptical deficiency, parabolic equality, and hyperbolic excess, before progressing or 
regressing through the process again, and so on, und so weiter… Alternatively, we 
                                                        
29 Mark Anderson, Kafka’s Clothes: Ornament and Aestheticism in the Habsburg Fin de Siècle (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), 9–10; cited in Damrosch, What is World Literature?, 189–90.   
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could turn the cone on its head and give a poet the last word, soliciting Christian 
Morgenstern’s incomparable funnel30: 
 
Zwei Trichter wandeln durch die Nacht. 
Durch ihres Rumpfs verengten Schacht 
fliesst weisses Mondlicht 







                                                        
30 Christian Morgenstern, “Zwei Trichter” (1905), in: Das Wasserzeichen der Poesie oder die Kunst und 
das Vergnügen Gedichte zu lesen: In hundertvierundsechzig Spielarten vorgestellt von Andreas 
Thalmayr [= Hans Magnus Enzensberger] (Nördlingen: Greno, 1985), 313.  
